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Punitive Damages and the Intoxicated Driver: An
Approach to Taylor v. Superior Court
By Santiago Fernandez*

Introduction
"[T]he great potential for human suffering which attends the presence on the highways of intoxicated drivers"' presents one of the most

complex legal and social problems of our times. 2 Studies of the various
methods currently employed have failed to identify the most effective
means of deterring intoxicated drivers.3 Although many experts still

stress the need for rehabilitative programs, 4 a growing number have

begun to question their effectiveness, 5 suggesting instead more stringent
* B.A., 1976, University of California at Los Angeles. Member, Third Year Class.
1. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154, 557 P.2d 669, 675, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534, 540 (1978).
2. See generally G. HALVERSON, STOP THE DRUNK DRIVER (1970); DRINKING (J. Ewing & B. Rouse eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as DRINKING]; Cramton, The Problem of the
Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A.J. 995 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The Problem of the Drinking
Driver]; Little, Control of the Drinking Driver: Science Challenges Legal Creativity, 54
A.B.A.J. 555 (1968).
3. "[N]either fines, nor conventional probation, nor routine therapeutic measures
available to the courts are superior means of rehabilitation of the first-time drunk-driving
offender." Ross & Blumenthal, Sanctionsfor the DrinkingDriver: An ExperimentalStudy, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 61 (1974). See DRINKING, supra note 2, at 135; Why Reducing Traffic
Deaths Proves Elusive, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, April 24, 1978, at 47.
4. See The Problemof the Drinking Driver,supra note 2; Little, Control of the Drinking
Driver: Science Challenges Legal Creativity, 54 A.B.A.J. 555 (1968); Aronson, Let's Get the
Drunk Out of the Driver'sSeat, TODAY'S HEALTH, December 1974, at 42.
5. In a recent report prepared by the California Department of Motor Vehicles and
the Department of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, the findings showed that a 12-month alcohol
abuse treatment program was not superior to mandatory licensing controls either in improving driving or life style. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES & DEP'T OF ALCOHOL
AND DRUG ABUSE, AN EVALUATION OF ALCOHOL ABUSE TREATMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO DRIVERS LICENSE SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION 7 (1978). In fact, program participants

had worse subsequent accident and conviction records than did nonparticipants. Id. at 4;
Drunk DriversJust Don't Listen, S.F. Examiner, January 5, 1979, at 58, col. 1. Reports such
as the one presented above have led some commentators to conclude that "[r]ehabilitative
measures for the drinking driver are expensive and their efficacy is questionable at best. It
would be difficult to justify the expenditure of large sums to treat huge numbers of drivers
...using measures that we cannot demonstrate to be effective." Waller, DrinkingandHighway Safety, in DRINKING, supra note 2, at 135.
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application of existing criminal sanctions. 6 Punitive damages 7 also
have been suggested as an alternative means of deterring intoxicated
drivers.8 The majority of jurisdictions which have considered the latter
proposal have favored the imposition of punitive awards. 9 Although
the California courts, following the minority position,' 0 traditionally
have denied punitive damages in such cases," the California Supreme
6. "[In the present state of knowledge the expenditure of funds on the more costly of
these measures, especially those designated as therapeutic, is without return in terms of subsequent behavior on the highway. In the absence of other considerations, the courts should
restrict themselves to fining the offenders." Ross & Blumenthal, Sanctionsforthe Drinking
Driver- An ExperimentalStudy, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 61 (1974).

"[S]ome critics question whether the new treatment methods are more effective than the
old practice of fining or jailing drunk drivers."

Why Reducing Traffic Deaths ProvesElusive,

April 24, 1978, at 47.
7. For a general discussion of punitive damages see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 77-85 (1935); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 2, at 9-14 (4th ed. 1971); DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE
DAMAGES (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969); Corboy, Should Punitive Damages be AbolU.S.

NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,

ished?-A Statement for the Negative, 1965 ABA SECT. INS. NEGL. & COMP. L. 282;
Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished?-A Statementfor the Affirmative, 1965
ABA SECT. INS. NEGL. & COMP. L. 282; Comment, The Relationship of Punitive Damages
and Compensatory Damages in Tort Actions, 75 DICK. L. REv. 585 (1971); Note, Exemplary
Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957); Note, The Impositionof Punishment by Civil Courts. A Reappraisalof Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158 (1966).

8. See Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); Payne v. Daley, 51
Ohio Misc. 65, 367 N.E.2d 75 (1977); Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973);
Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970). For a general discussion of the
applicability of punitive damages in automobile accident litigation, see Logan, Punitive
Damagesin Automobile Cases, 1961 INS. L. J. 27; Note, Negligent Intoxicated Driver Liable
for Punitive Damages without ProofofAbnormal or Reckless Driving, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
221 (1978); Comment, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036 (1960); Note, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 528 (1971);

Comment, 46 IowA L. REV. 645 (1961). See 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 244 (1965).
9. Thirteen jurisdictions have allowed the imposition of punitive damages on intoxicated drivers. See, e.g., Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 (1929); Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 234 Ark. 347, 352 S.W.2d 96 (1961); Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 Conn. 506, 199 A.2d 693
(1964); Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976); Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 2d 564,
153 N.E.2d 90 (1958); Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954); Southland
Broadcasting Co. v. Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So. 2d 572 (1951); Svejcara v. Whitman, 82
N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (1971); Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973);
Payne v. Daley, 51 Ohio Misc. 65, 367 N.E.2d 75 (1977); Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508
P.2d 211 (1973); Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970); Pratt v. Duck,
28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945).
10. See, e.g., Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
759 (1947); Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954); Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C.
327, 174 S.E.2d 74 (1970); Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okla. 112, 247 P.2d 964 (1952); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 303 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957); Eubank v. Spencer, 203 Va. 923,
128 S.E.2d 299 (1962). See generaly 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 244 (1965); Annot., 65
A.L.R.3d 656 (1975).
11. See notes 28-39 & accompanying text infra.
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Court has never specifically addressed the issue.' 2 A case now pending
before the court, Taylor v. Superior Court,'3 affords it that opportunity.
The facts of Taylor are not uncommon.' 4 On September 1, 1977,
the vehicle driven by the defendant Clair William Stille collided headon with seventeen year old Cameron Taylor's Volkswagen van. The
defendant, a salesman for a wholesale liquor distributor, was intoxicated at the time of the collision. The plaintiff suffered severe facial
disfigurement and the permanent loss of his teeth. In addition, he was
unable to continue his undergraduate studies for an extended period of
time. 15
The allegations of the complaint established that the defendant (1)
was an alcoholic; (2) previously had been arrested and convicted for
driving while under the influence of alcohol; (3) recently had completed a period of probation imposed as the result of a conviction for
driving while intoxicated; (4) was required by the terms of the probation to refrain from driving a motor vehicle for at least six hours following the consumption of any alcoholic beverage; (5) was, at the time
of the accident, facing "an additional, separate and distinct criminal
charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol";
(6) previously had caused an automobile accident while driving under
the influence of alcohol; and (7) was consuming an alcoholic beverage
at the time of the collision.' 6 On the basis of these facts the plaintiff
sought punitive damages, alleging that the defendant, although aware
of his inability to drive while intoxicated, nevertheless attempted to
drive while intoxicated, resulting in injury to the plaintiff.
The defendant demurred to Taylor's claim for punitive damages
on the ground that the complaint failed to allege the requisite malice.17
The court sustained the demurrer on the ground that an allegation of
intoxication alone was insufficient to support an allegation of malice.
Taylor's application for a writ of mandamus was denied by the court of
appeal. On May 16, 1978, the California Supreme Court granted a
hearing in the case.
This Note examines the applicability of punitive damages to cases
12. See Franson, Exemplary Damagesin Vehicle Accident Cases,50 CAL. ST. B.J. 93, 94
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Franson].
13. C-219831 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 10, 1977), appeal docketed, Civil No. L.A. 30940
(Cal. Sup. Ct., April 27, 1978). While this Note was at the press, the California Supreme
Court decided Taylor v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 3d 890 (1979). A discussion of that decision
appears in the author's postscript at the end of this Note.
14. See, e.g., Aronson, Let's Get the Drunk Out ofthe Driver's Seat, TODAY'S HEALTH,
Dec. 1974, at 38; Morando, Smash-upl, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, June 1977, at 102.

15. Plaintiff's Complaint at 4-7, Taylor v. Superior Court, C-219831 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Nov. 10, 1977), appealdocketed, Civil No. L.A. 30940 (Cal. Sup. Ct., April 27, 1978).
16. Id. at 10-13.
17. See notes 19, 37-40 & accompanying text infra.
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involving intoxicated drivers.' The current state of the law regarding
punitive damages and intoxicated drivers, and possible alternative approaches to the problem, are considered. Particular attention is paid to
the concept of malice as required for the allowance of punitive awards
under Civil Code section 3294, and the adoption of an alternative standard for defining malice under the statute is suggested. This Note concludes that as a matter of public policy, and as a means of deterring
intoxicated drivers, punitive damages should be allowed when the facts
and circumstances of a case demonstrate a conscious disregard on the
part of the defendant for the safety of others.
Punitive Damages in California
In California, any award of punitive damages must conform to the
requirements of section 3294 of the Civil Code, which provides: "In an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express
or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." 19
Punitive damages, under section 3294, are awarded not for the
20
sake of compensating the injured party, but strictly as punishment.
They are not favored by the courts and are to be granted only with "the
greatest caution" 2' and "in the clearest of cases."' 22 Such damages cannot be claimed as a matter of right, 23 but are granted or withheld solely
18. The term "intoxicated driver" will be used throughout this Note to mean any driver
found to have a blood-alcohol level above. 10%. This use of the term is in keeping with the
presumption of intoxication set out in CAL. VEH. CODE § 23126(a)(3) (West 1971). Statistics
show that the risk of being responsible for an automobile accident increases significantly
above the .10% level. See DRINKING, supra note 2, at 122-25; Cramton, Driver Behaviorand
Legal Sanctions, 67 MICH. L. REV. 421, 437-38 (1969); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS

14 (1967).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
20. "The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual dam-

ages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff." Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 801, 197 P.2d 713,
720 (1948). See Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 163, 217 P.2d 19, 20 (1950); Di Giorgio
Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 580, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 361 (1963) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908(1) (1939)).

21.
22.
23.

Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526, 322 P.2d 933, 939 (1958).
Id.
Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 163, 217 P.2d 19, 21 (1950); Brewer v. Second

Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 800, 197 P.2d 713, 719 (1948); Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal.
279, 282, 9 P.2d 505, 506 (1932). See 3 PERSONAL INJURY § 2.02, at 22 (L. Frumer, R.
Benoit & M. Freidman eds. 1965).
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at the discretion of the trier of fact. 24 Because they are assessed as punishment, "a positive element of conscious wrongdoing is always re25
quired."
Public policy and the interest of society in deterring flagrant misconduct serve as the principal justifications for allowing punitive damage awards. 26 Accordingly, the applicability of punitive damages to
cases involving intoxicated drivers is apparent once one recognizes that
"[i]ntoxication of a driver is egregious social misconduct which should
sufficiently aggravate a defendant's negligence to permit recovery of
punitive damages .... -27
California's Present Position Regarding Intoxicated Drivers
In California, the ability of an injured party to recover punitive
damages from an intoxicated driver was first addressed in the case of
Strauss v. Buckley. 28 The undisputed facts in Strauss showed only that
the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. At the conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the
amount of $5,000. The defendant appealed the judgment on the
ground that the award was excessive. In ruling that the judgment was
"manifestly excessive," 29 the court stated:
The damages recoverable in a case of this kind are to be compensatory only; punitive damages are not recoverable because of the
drunkenness of the defendant. That is an offense in itself for which
punishment may be imposed in the ordinary course of law. Evidence
of the drunkenness may be offered, of course, to show the negligence
of the driver, but it may not be used to enhance the award of damages beyond 30that which will fairly compensate the plaintiff for injuries suffered.
Because the award in Strauss, albeit excessive, was compensatory,3' the court's statement regarding the applicability of punitive
damages to such cases was mere dictum. More importantly, the court's
reasoning that punitive damages could not be awarded when punish24. See Triton Ins. Underwriters v. National Chiropractic Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d
829, 831, 43 Cal. Rptr. 504, 505 (1965).
25. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79, at 280 (1935).
26. "The primary function of punitive damages is to deter the defendant and those
similarly situated from engaging in similar tortious conduct in the future." Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 409, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 99 (1970). See 22 AM.
JUR. 2d Damages § 237 (1965); Comment, Punitive Damages and Their PossibleApplication

in Automobile Accident Litigation,46 VA. L. REv. 1036, 1041 (1960).
27. Comment, 46 IOWA L. REv. 645, 650 (1961). See notes 94-95 & accompanying text
infra.
28. 20 Cal. App. 2d 7, 65 P.2d 1352 (1937).
29. Id. at 8, 65 P.2d at 1353.
30. Id.
31. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 656, 674 (1975).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

ment might otherwise be imposed in the ordinary course of law was
contrary to the clear weight of authority in California. 32 Nevertheless,
33
twenty-one years after Strauss, the court of appeal in Gombos v. A she
accepted as settled law the rule set forth in Strauss that a claim alleging
to show the
only the intoxication of an automobile driver is insufficient
34
requisite malice for a punitive award in such cases.
In Gombos, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendant did
wilfully, wrongfully, recklessly and unlawfully ... maintain, control
and operate [his automobile] in a grossly negligent, and highly reckless manner with absolute disregard and callous indifference to the
rights and safety of all persons on said highway at said time, including the plaintiffs, in that said defendant was then and there knowingly and wilfully intoxicated . . . well knowing that . . . the
excessive alcoholic refreshments consumed by him rendered him
physically unfit to operate a motor vehicle. . . [and] a menace to all
persons using said highway.

....

35

On the basis of these allegations, the plaintiffs sought punitive
damages. In sustaining the defendant's demurrer, the court of appeal
stated that the allegations, read as a whole, claimed only that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. 36 In the court's
opinion, intoxication alone was insufficient to satisfy the malice requirement of Civil Code section 3294:37
[T]he mere characterization of the conduct challenged as wilful, reckless, wrongful and unlawful is not itself sufficient to charge the malice in fact required to sustain a cause of action for punitive
damages .... 38
. . . One who becomes intoxicated, knowing that he intends to
drive his automobile on the highway, is of course negligent, and perhaps grossly negligent. It is a reckless and wrongful and illegal thing
32. See Bundy v. Maginess, 76 Cal. 532, 534, 18 P. 668, 669 (1888); Wilson v. Middleton, 2 Cal. 54 (1852). In Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948), the Arkan-

sas Supreme Court, in upholding an award of punitive damages against an intoxicated
driver, noted the "fallacy" of the court's reasoning in Straussand cited Bundy as support for
its position. Id. at 249-50, 210 S.W.2d at 295.
33.
34.

158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958).
Id. at 528, 322 P.2d at 940. Although the court in Gombos acknowledged that the

reason given by the court in Strauss for denying punitive damages, ie., because the wrongful act was punishable criminally, was contrary to the weight of authority in California, it
nevertheless adhered to the rule, noting that the fact that the Legislature had "met many
times since the rule was first announced and [had] not seen fit to change the law. . . . [was]
entitled to some weight." Id.
35. 158 Cal. App. 2d at 526, 322 P.2d at 939.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 529, 322 P.2d at 940. But see Mason v. Mercury Cas. Co., 64 Cal. App. 3d
471, 473-74, 134 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1976). See note 61 & accompanying text infra.
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39
to do. But it is not a malicious act.

The Strauss and Gombos decisions demonstrate that the primary
obstacle to the allowance of punitive damages in cases of intoxicated
drivers is the malice in fact requirement of section 3294.40 Thus, if the

supreme court is to alter existing law, a re-examination of the concept
of malice is required.

Malice
Current State of the Law
The California courts have not been consistent in applying the

malice requirement of section 3294.4 ' While some courts have adhered
to the view first set out in the case of Davis v. Hearst,4 2 that malice may

in cases involving a wilful or intentional act evincing an
be found only'43

"evil motive,
other courts have found "conscious disregard of another's rights" 44 or "safety" 45 to be "an appropriate description of the
39. 158 Cal. App. 2d at 527, 322 P.2d at 940.
40. Malice under the statute has been judicially interpreted to mean malice in fact, as
opposed to fictional malice or malice implied at law. Wolfsen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal. 2d 632,
647, 198 P.2d 1, 10 (1948), overruled on othergrounds, Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal. 2d 492, 497,
364 P.2d 263, 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90 (1961); Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 162, 116 P. 530,
539 *(1911); Franson, supra note 12, at 94.
41. "In order to test plaintiffs allegations as a charge of malice, it is necessary to observe the elements of the malice which justifies an exemplary award. At this point one discovers a plethora of appellate elucidations. California courts have indulged in a profusion
of pejorative terms to describe malice. A survey reveals several separate and somewhat
divergent currents of California case law." G.D: Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
App. 3d 22, 29, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222-23 (1975). See Taylor, Punitive Damges in Business
Litigation,3 ORANGE CoUNTY B.J. 384, 386-87 (1976); Comment, Punitive Damagesin Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895, 901-06 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Cases].
42. 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 (1911).
43. See Wolsfen v. Hathaway, 32 Cal. 2d 632, 647, 198 P.2d 1, 10-11 (1948); Fidelity
Appraisal Co. v. Federal Appraisal Co., 217 Cal. 307, 319, 18 P.2d 950, 955 (1933); Henderson v. Security Nat'l Bank, 72 Cal. App. 3d 764, 771-72, 140 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392 (1977);
Simmons v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 341, 368-69, 133 Cal. Rptr. 42, 58
(1976); Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709 (1972); Gruner v.
Barber, 207 Cal. App. 2d 54, 59, 24 Cal. Rptr. 292, 295 (1962); McAfee v. Ricker, 195 Cal.
App. 2d 630, 633-34, 15 Cal. Rptr. 920, 922-23 (1961); Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d
517, 526-27, 322 P.2d 933, 939 (1958); Fitzpatrick v. Clark, 26 Cal. App. 2d 710, 712-13, 80
P.2d 183, 184 (1938); Ross v. Sweeters, 119 Cal. App. 716, 724, 7 P.2d 334, 338 (1932). See
generally Punitive Damagesin ProductsLiability Cases,supra note 41, at 902-04.
44. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 922-23, 582 P.2d 980, 986-87, 148
Cal. Rptr. 389, 395-96 (1978); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521
P.2d 1103, 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974); Mason v. Mercury Cas. Co., 64 Cal. App. 3d
471, 474, 134 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1976); Beck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 54 Cal.
App. 3d 347, 355, 126 Cal. Rptr. 602, 607 (1976).
45. See O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 806, 142 Cal. Rptr.
487, 492 (1977); Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 607, 136 Cal.
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animus malus requisite to an award of punitive damages."' 46 Indeed, in
some instances, even reckless disregard of another's rights or safety has
been held sufficient to support a finding of malice. 47 The effect of these
divergent and, at times, contradictory decisions has been to cast the law
regarding the availability of punitive damages 48in non-deliberate tort
cases into a state of confusion and uncertainty.
Conscious Disregard of Another's Rights or Safety: The Emergence of a
New Standard
Recent cases indicate a trend toward the adoption of conscious
disregard of another's rights or safety as an appropriate description of
malice. 49 Arguably, this trend reflects a growing awareness that something less than an actual intent to injure should be characterized as
malice.50 A brief review of the relevant cases serves to illustrate the
point.
Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co.," involving an insurance
bad faith claim, was one of the first cases to adopt conscious disregard
52
of another's rights as an adequate description of the requisite malice.
Rptr. 787, 791 (1977); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 32, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 218, 224-25 (1975).
46. Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 607, 136 Cal. Rptr. 787,
791 (1977).
47. See Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 922, 523 P.2d 662, 671, 114
Cal. Rptr. 622, 631 (1974); Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston Purina Co., 69 Cal. 2d 461,
471, 446 P.2d 152, 158, 72 Cal. Rptr. 344, 350 (1968); Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal.
2d 863, 869-70, 118 P.2d 465, 468-69 (1941) (dictum); Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553, 55657 (1860) (decided before the enactment of Civil Code § 3294); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell
Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 713-14, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 415 (1967); Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 185
Cal. App. 2d 676, 682, 8 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517 (1960); Sturges v. Charles L. Harney, Inc., 165
Cal. App. 2d 306, 322, 331 P.2d 1072, 1081 (1958). But see Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278,
284, 562 P.2d 316, 319, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1977); Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d
891, 896, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709 (1972). For a general discussion of the foregoing cases, see
Franson, supra note 11, at 95-96, 146.
48. Taylor, Punitive Damages in Business Litigation, 3 ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 384, 387
(1976). See Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Cases, supra note 41, at 901-06.
49. See notes 44-45 & accompanying text supra.
50. "To prove that a tort was maliciously perpertrated it is not necessary to establish a
specifc intent againsttheperson wronged." Farmy v. College Housing, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d
166, 174, 121 Cal. Rptr. 658, 664 (1975) (emphasis in original). "[I]n order to establish malice for both liability and punitive damages personal hostility or ill will need not be shown
... " Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 66, 529 P.2d 608, 625, 118 Cal. Rptr.
184, 201 (1974). See Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., I1 Cal. 3d 908, 922, 523 P.2d 662,
671, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 631 (1974); Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Cases,supra note
41, at 905-06. See generally Franson, supra note 12, at 94.
51. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
52. The phrase "conscious disregard of another's rights" had been employed by the
courts prior to the Silberg decision. See, e.g., Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 626, 8
Cal. Rptr. 514 (1960), wherein the court noted that "a tort committed . . . without such
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The trial court in Silberg granted a motion for a new trial on the
ground that the evidence did not sustain the award of punitive dam-

ages. The supreme court, upholding the trial court's finding that the
plaintiff failed to establish oppressive conduct by the insurance company, noted that "[iun order to justify an award of exemplary damages
. . . [the defendant] must act with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or
with a conscious disregardof plaintifs ights.' '53 Unfortunately, the
court in Silberg did not go on to explain the meaning of the conscious

disregard formula or its significance.
After carefully reviewing the varied judicial interpretations of the
requirement, the court of appeal in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior
malice 54
Court, adopted the Silberg formulation and suggested "conscious disregard of safety as an appropriate description of the animus malus

which may justify an exemplary damage award when non-deliberate

injury is alleged." 55 The court noted that while "adherence to the Davis
v. Hearst formulation is not troublesome when the plaintiff charges a
deliberate tort,"' 5 6 in some instances in which the defendant's conduct
warrants punishment under the statute, the plaintiff may be unable to
prove actual, "wrongful, personal intention to injure." 57 In such cases,
the court felt that the concept of malice should be extended "beyond
deliberate injury [to] characterize aggravated and culpable instances of
58
non-deliberate conduct.1

The court in Mason v. Mercury Casualty Co. 59 emphasized the fact

that conscious disregard of another's rights or safety can serve as an

alternative to the "actual-intent-to-injure" test.60 The plaintiff in Mason sought punitive damages from the defendant insurer on the
grounds that it had "wilfully and wantonly 6' breached its fiduciary rerecklessness as evinces malice or a conscious disregard of the rights of others, does not warrant punitive damages." Id. at 682, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
53. 11 Cal. 3d at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (emphasis added). Interestingly, in Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr.
622 (1974), decided shortly after Silberg, Justice Tobriner, quoting from Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), noted that "malice...
may be established by a showing that the defendant's wrongful conduct was willful, intentional, and done in reckless disregardof its possible results." 11 Cal. 3d at. 922, 523 P.2d at
671, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 631 (emphasis added). The Silberg opinion was not cited in Schroeder.
54. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
55. Id. at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
56. Id. at 30, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
57. Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 162 (1911). See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
58. 49 Cal. App. 3d at 30, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
59. 64 Cal. App. 3d 471, 134 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1976).
60. See note 43 & accompanying text supra. See generally Franson, supra note 12, at
94-95; Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Cases,supra note 41, at 902-04.
61. Note that the court accepted this allegation as "adequate to meet the requirement
of allegation of oppression [sic] fraud or malice required by Civil Code section 3294 and
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lationship. . . by refusing payment" 62 on his claim. The jury awarded
punitive damages in the amount of $25,000, but a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict was granted by the trial court. The court's
ruling was affirmed on appeal on the ground that the plaintiff had
sufficient evidence to show that the defendant acted
failed to produce
"with intent63 to vex, injure or annoy . . . or in the alternative64 . . .
65
acted with a conscious disregard of plaintiff's rights."
Although the alternative standard for malice set forth in Searle
had been recognized by courts, as in Mason, not until Seimon v. Southern Pacific TransportationCo. 66 was decided was the conscious disregard formula actually applied in favor of a plaintiff. In Seimon, the
plaintiff, a truck driver, brought suit against the railroad alleging, inter
alia, willful misconduct in failing to provide adequate warning at a
railroad crossing. The evidence showed that although the defendant
knew of the dangerous conditions, it took no remedial action. 67 The
trial court granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit to the plaintiff's
claim for punitive damages. The court of appeal reversed, holding
that, under the Searle formula, 68 it was improper for the trial court to
say "as a matter of law, that there was such a paucity of evidence on the
from considering the propriety of
issue of malice to preclude the jury
'69
an award of punitive damages.

O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp.70 is perhaps the most significant recent decision in that the court specifically relied on the conscious
disregard formula to find the requisite malice. The plaintiff, a rape viccase law upon which appellant may rest his claim to recover punitive damages." 64 Cal.
App. 3d at 473-74, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 547. But see Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517,
529, 322 P.2d 933, 940 (1958). See note 38 & accompanying text supra.
62. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 473, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
63. Emphasis omitted.
64. Emphasis added. Cf. Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 284, 562 P.2d 316, 319, 137
Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1977) (alternative instruction for punitive damages based on "reckless
disregard" held to be in error).
65. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 474, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 547 (citation to Silberg omitted).
66. 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 136 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1977).
67. The evidence did not show that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff; it
showed only that the defendant knowingly disregarded a potentially serious risk of harm.
Id. at 608, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
68. "The Searle court, after exhaustively reviewing the various judicial formulations of
malice in cases of non-deliberate tortious conduct settled upon conscious disregardof safety
as an appropriate description of the animus malus requisite to an award of punitive damages. Using this yardstick, we turn now to plaintiff's most serious allegation concerning
defendant's failure to provide adequate crossing protection." 67 Cal. App. 3d at 607, 136
Cal. Rptr. at 791.
69. Id. at 609, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 792. The court noted that "the jury could have gleaned
from [the] evidence that defendant had displayed a conscious and callous indifference to, or
.d.
I..."
disregard of, probable harm to motorists .
70. 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977).
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tim, alleged that the defendants, owners of the plaintiff's apartment
complex, negligently had failed to provide adequate security and to
warn the plaintiff of the known danger of rape. 7 ' Punitive damages
were sought on the ground that the defendants-through their authorized agents-acted with conscious disregard for the plaintiff's safety.
At trial, the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages was sustained. The court of appeal, however, reversed the
ruling and held:
In a case such as this one, where the injury is not deliberately inflicted by the defendant, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted with conscious disregard of the plaintiff's safety....
Here, the individual [defendants] allegedly knew of the serious
potential danger to [the plaintiff] as a female tenant. Yet they intentionally misled her in order to advance their pecuniary interest in
conscious disregard of [plainrenting an apartment. [On these facts]
72
tiff's] safety was sufficiently alleged.
The O'Hara decision establishes that although a defendant may
not have an actual, "wrongful, personal intention to injure" his or her
conduct may nevertheless evince such a conscious disregard of a "serious potential danger" as to warrant an award of punitive damages.
Conscious Disregard Defined
The foregoing cases illustrate that the courts, by adopting the conscious disregard formula, have been willing to expand the concept of
malice to encompass instances of aggravated, yet nondeliberate mis73
conduct, thereby obviating the need to prove actual intent to injure.
Interestingly enough, however, the courts have rejected "recklessness"
as sufficient for a finding of malice.7 4 The only conclusion possible is
that the term conscious disregard describes a state of mind which lies
somewhere between the realms of intentionality and recklessness.
An actor's conduct is characterized as reckless if he or she performs an act or intentionally fails to perform an act which he or she
knows or has reason to know will unreasonably increase the risk of
71. Id. at 801, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489. "[T]he same person who had been depicted in the
composite drawings which had earlier been supplied to [the defendants] and were still in
their possession" was later identified by the plaintiff as the rapist. Id. at 802, 142 Cal. Rptr.
at 489.
72. Id. at 806, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 492. The court's statement seems to indicate that puni-

tive damages could have been awarded on the basis of fraud. Yet, the holding clearly shows
that the award was predicated on a finding of malice.
73. See Franson, supra note 12, at 94.
74. See Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 284-85, 562 P.2d 316, 319, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635,
638 (1977); Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 896, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 709 (1972);
Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 530, 322 P.2d 933, 941 (1958); Franson, supra note
12, at 94, 147. But see note 47 & accompanying text supra.
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physical harm to another. 75 In determining whether an actor's actions
are reckless, an objective standard, ie., the "reasonable person" test, is
applied. 76 Under this test no attempt is made to distinguish between an
actor whose actions knowingly created an unreasonable risk of harm,
and one who should have known. When the issue of punitive damages
is raised, however, the subjective state of mind of the actor becomes allimportant. 77 Knowledge, or awareness of the risks, is what distinguishes the concept of conscious disregard from mere recklessness.
An actor who acts in knowing disregard of an unreasonable risk of
harm to others exhibits a much greater degree of moral culpability than
one who acts unaware of the risk. The element of choice is the decisive
factor. A recklessness standard, embracing both actual knowledge and
imputed knowledge, overlooks the element of choice. A conscious disregard standard, on the other hand, emphasizes the element of choice:
an actor who consciously disregards an obvious risk effectively chooses
to increase the potential for harm. Should the harm occur, a punitive
sanction is warranted.
In applying the foregoing standard, a jury in an intoxicated driver
case could be instructed as follows:
If you find that, before becoming intoxicated, the defendant knew or
was conscious of the potentially serious 7 8 risk of harm to another in
driving while intoxicated and, having full knowledge of such a risk
acted in disregard thereof [e.g., by placing himself or herself in a
position that requires intoxicated driving], you may then find that the
defendant acted with such conscious disregard of the plaintiffs rights
or safety as to evince malice. 79 Upon such a finding, punitive damages may be awarded.
Framing the concept of conscious disregard in terms of a defendant's actual knowledge places a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff.
For example, merely proving that the defendant had a drink before
undertaking to drive, in most circumstances, would not sustain a finding that the defendant was fully aware of his or her inability to drive
75.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

LAW OF TORTS

§ 500 (1965); W. PROSSER,

HANDBOOK OF THE

§ 34, at 185 (4th ed. 1971).

76. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 185 (1971). See Franson,
supra note 12, at 147.
77. Franson, supra note 12, at 147.
78. See note 72 & accompanying text supra.
79. Cf CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL: BAJI § 14.71 (6th rev. ed. 1977)
("Malice . . . may be inferred . . . by showing that the defendant's conduct was wilful,
intentional, and done in reckless disregard of its possible results"). But see G.D. Searle &
Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 31, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 224: "[In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,] the court declares that malice may be established by evidence of conduct

which is 'wilful, intentional and done in reckless disregard of its possible results.' [Citation
omitted.] According to dictionary definitions, willfulness and intent denote deliberation or
design; recklessness, in contrast, connotes action which is insensate, heedless or negligent.

To apply these adjectives conjunctively to a single course of conduct is self-contradictory."
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and acted in conscious disregard thereof. Similarly, a greater degree of
proof would be required to show that young drivers, presumably inexperienced both in driving and in the use of alcohol, actually knew of
their inability to drive while intoxicated or of the amount of alcohol
that would render them incapable of operating a motor vehicle. The
stringent burden is justified, however, because the conscious disregard
formula exposes the intoxicated driver to potentially greater liability.
Thus, the adoption of conscious disregard of-another's rights or safety
as an alternative description of the requisite malice not only would allow punitive damages to be recovered against intoxicated drivers, it
would provide the necessary check to runaway damage awards in such
cases.
Approaches to Taylor
In deciding Taylor, the supreme court may either affirm the trial
court's ruling on the basis of Gombos and Strauss, limit the GombosStrauss rule to cases in which intoxication is the sole allegation, or
adopt conscious disregard of another's safety as an adequate descrip80
tion of malice and remand the case for determination on that basis.
Each of these alternatives will be examined.
The trial court's ruling in Taylor could be affirmed by the supreme
court on the grounds that, under Gombos, "punitive damages may not
8
be recovered because of the intoxication of an automobile driver."'
Such a ruling would overlook the obvious factual distinctions between
Taylor and the previous cases8 2 and would unnecessarily limit the
availability of punitive damages to cases where an actual intent to injure has been shown. As previously noted, the trend in recent punitive
damage cases has been to the contrary.
Unlike Taylor, the facts in both Gombos and Strauss reveal only
that the defendants allegedly were intoxicated at the time of the accident.8 3 In neither case was there an allegation of concurrent, aggravated misconduct. Consequently, one could argue that the decisions in
both cases stand solely for the proposition that allegations of intoxication alone will not satisfy the malice requirement of section 3294. Indeed, this interpretation of those cases finds support in a court of
84
appeal decision, Pelletti v. Membrila.
In Pelletti, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in a
80. This Note recognizes the fact that the court could adopt "recklessness" as an appropriate standard for malice under the statute. However, in light of established authority to
the contrary, this possibility seems remote at best. See note 74 supra.
81. 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 527-28, 322 P.2d 933, 940 (1958).
82. See text accompanying notes 15-16, 28-29, 35 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 15-16, 28-29, 35 supra.
84. 234 Cal. App. 2d 606, 44 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1965).
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course of misconduct consisting of (1) intoxication, (2) "speed excessive
for the time and place and condition of the driver," (3) gross inatten85
tiveness or incapacity, and (4) flight from the scene of the accident.
In holding the plaintiff's allegations sufficient to support a finding of
wilful misconduct, the court stated:
It has been said that intoxication by itself is insufficient evidence to
support a charge of wilful misconduct. .

.

. [However,] the present

case does not depend upon intoxication alone, but on intoxication
combined with other factors, which added together support an inference that defendant's misconduct falls within the category described
as flirting with danger and thereby acquires the attribute of wilfulness. .

.

. When several elements of misconduct, including intoxica-

tion, are present, the sum of these elements may add up to wilful
86
misconduct even though no single element alone might suffice.
On the basis of the court's rationale in Pelletti, the supreme court,
in deciding Taylor, simply could limit the application of the GombosStrauss rule.8 7 Punitive damages could then be recovered in cases
where intoxication is but one element of an entire course of misconduct. By adopting this approach and requiring that an entire course of
misconduct be shown, the court would, however, effectively limit the
applicability of punitive damages to cases in which such damages
might otherwise have been recovered regardless of the intoxication of
the driver. Thus, an intoxicated driver, whose driving behavior up until the time of the accident was for all practical purposes normal, could
still avoid liability. Under this approach, then, the application of punitive damages in these cases would depend to a large extent on factors
other than the primary misconduct, i e., intoxicated driving, to justify
the punitive award.
Another problem with merely limiting the Gombos-Strauss rule is
that even if an entire course of misconduct is shown, courts still must
satisfy the malice requirement for punitive damages. In doing so, the
courts will be forced to infer intent from the defendant's erratic driving
behavior. Such a tortuous inference would not be necessary, however,
if the conscious disregard formula were adopted.
For example, in Taylor, the defendant's long history of alcohol
abuse and his numerous prior convictions for driving while intoxicated
indicate that he was fully aware of his inability to drive while intoxicated and that he knew of the potential risks involved in driving in such
a state. On the basis of these facts, a jury could find that by placing
himself in a position which practically insured his having to drive while
85. Id. at 611-12, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
86. Id. at 612, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (citations omitted).
87. This approach has been suggested by the petitioner in Taylor. Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 6-8, Taylor v. Superior Court, 2 Civ. 53217 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Nov. 10, 1977), appeal docketed, Civil No. L.A. 30940 (Cal. Sup. Ct., April 27, 1978).
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intoxicated, and by in fact driving while intoxicated, the defendant
acted with conscious disregard for the plaintiff's safety. If conscious
disregard of another's safety were adopted by the supreme court as an
alternative description of malice, the defendant in Taylor could be
found to have acted maliciously. Upon such a finding, punitive damages could be awarded under section 3294.
As has been shown, adoption of the conscious disregard formula
not only would alleviate the current confusion by establishing a more
flexible standard for malice, but would allow punitive damages to be
awarded against intoxicated drivers. For these reasons, this Note urges
adoption of the conscious disregard formula.

Policy Considerations
The "catastrophic personal and economic impact"8 of vehicular
accidents involving intoxicated drivers is well documented. In Califor-

nia alone, fifty-two percent of all fatal motor vehicle accidents in 1977

were alcohol related.8 9 Nationwide, sixty percent of the drivers killed
in single car crashes were found to have been drinking. 90 Perhaps in
response to these and other staggering statistics, 9 1 and as a result of the

apparent failure of alternative methods of deterrence, 92 many jurisdictions have allowed punitive damages to be recovered from intoxicated
93
drivers.
The decisions allowing punitive damage awards have been based

largely on public policy considerations.94 In most instances, the courts
88. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154, 577 P.2d 699, 675, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534, 540 (1978).
89. DEP'T OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, 1977 ANN. REPORT OF FATAL & INJURY
MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS 70. Driving under the influence of alcohol or alcohol

and drugs was found to be the primary collision factor in 31.4% of all fatal motor vehicle
accidents. Id. at 67. Alcohol was implicated in 22% of all motor vehicle accidents which
resulted in physical injury. Id. at 70.
90. DRINKING, supra note 2, at 77.
91. "In the year 1976 there were 257,846 adult misdemeanor arrests for drunk driving
reported in California.... Considering the fact that this number, large as it is, represents
arrests only, and does not include the marginal or undetected drivers who have imbibed, the
figure may well represent only the tip of a statistical iceberg." Coulter v. Superior Court, 21
Cal. 3d 144, 154, 577 P.2d 669, 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 540 (1978) (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
92. See note 5 supra.
93. Recent cases illustrate the courts' reactions to these statistics. See, e.g., Ingram v.
Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976); Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (Ct. App.
1971); Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973); Payne v.
Daley, 51 Ohio Misc. 65, 367 N.E.2d 75 (Ct. C.P. Hamilton County 1977); Harrell v. Ames,
265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973); Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 35, 268 A.2d 157
(1970).
94. See Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d 22, 26, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306, 310 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1973); Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 190-91, 508 P.2d 211, 215 (1973); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Dam-
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simply have recognized that such flagrant misconduct as driving while
intoxicated "deserve[s] punishment more severe than would result from
an award of compensatory damages only."' 95 As noted by the Oregon
Supreme Court in Harrell v. Ames 9 6:
It may be debatable whether either awards of punitive damages or
the imposition of criminal penalties will effectively deter persons
from driving after drinking. However, in the absence of a showing of
substantial evidence to the contrary, we are not prepared to hold that
law enforcement officials and courts, who have a heavy responsibility
in this area, are wrong in their present apparent assumption that both
criminal penalties and awards of punitive damages may have
9 7 at least
some deterrent effect in dealing with this serious problem.
Contrary to the court's opinion in Harrell,opponents of punitive
damages 98 question the effectiveness of such awards in deterring intoxicated drivers. Deterrence based on fear, they argue, depends upon a
number of factors which may not be present in such cases. 99 They note
that the general public is, for the most part, unaware of the implications
of punitive damage awards and thus will not be deterred by them.1°°
Further, opponents suggest that "when balanced against the need to
control drinking [drivers], the individual's desire to use his vehicle as
an extension of his personality [and] to engage in pleasurable activity
such as partying or drinking may well be preferred by a large portion
of the populace."'' ° Finally, they argue that the high incidence of
drunk driving which currently goes undetected lends little credence to
ages §237 (1965); Comment, Punitive Damages and Their PossibleApplication in Automobile
Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036, 1048 (1960).
95. Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 656, 661-62 (1975). "Automobiles represent the most lethal

and deadly weapons today entrusted to our citizenry. When automobiles are driven by intoxicated drivers, the possibility of death and serious injury increases substantially. Every
licensed driver is aware that driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor presents
a significant and very real danger to others in the area. Thus, we have no hesitancy in
concluding that an intentional assault with fists may, in certain instances, constitute action
less outrageous than attempting to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor...

[and that] evidence of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor may constitute a
sufficient ground for allowing punitive damages." Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 35,
41-42, 268 A.2d 157, 161 (1970).
96. 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973).

97. Id. at 190-91, 508 P.2d at 215. "The possible imposition of a civil penalty in the
form of punitive damages may well be, at least as to some drivers, a more effective deterrent
than any possible criminal penalty which may be imposed." Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d
22, 26, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306, 310 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
98. See DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES (D.
Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969).
99. The Problem of the Drinking Driver,supra note 2, at 997-98.
100. See DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES I I
(D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969).
101. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions, 67 MICH. L. REV. 421, 441 (1969).
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any fears of being apprehended and punished, 10 2 and that problem
drinkers, lacking the capacity to choose rationally not to drive while
intoxicated, should be treated and not punished for their actions. 103
Thus, opponents of punitive damages conclude that the imposition of
punitive liability on intoxicated drivers will not only prove ineffective,
but, in most instances, detrimental. 04
These arguments invite several comments. First, one could argue
that the public is not unaware of the implications of money damage
awards in civil cases.' 0 5 The immediate public reaction to the California Supreme Court's ruling in the "host-liability" case,' 06 Coulter v. SuperiorCourt,'0 7 indicates not only that the public is aware of the effects
of civil damage awards, but that in at least some instances the spectre
of punitive damages will have some deterrent effect. Second, while it
may be that many Americans drink and drive, and do so regularly, it
cannot be assumed that the vast majority will not be deterred by the
prospect of suffering the imposition of stricter penalties. 0 8 Third, as
noted by the court in Colligan v. Fera,0 9 the availability of punitive
damage awards "may not infrequently induce the victim, otherwise unwilling to proceed because of the attendant trouble and expense, to take
action against the wrongdoer.' l10 Finally, although there is general
agreement that alcoholism is a disease,' the fact that a driver, whose
intoxicated state has caused an accident, is an alcoholic should not ex2
cuse his or her misconduct."1
102.
103.
104.

The Problem of the Drinking Driver,su.pra note 2, at 998.
See note 113 & accompanying text infra.
The Problem of the DrinkingDriver, supra note 2, at 998.

105. See, e.g., *hy Everybody isSuing Everybody, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
December 4, 1978, at 50-55.
106. "This finding stirred so much controversy that the California Legislature earlier
this year passed a law limiting liability in such cases to the drinker." Why Everybody is
Suing Everybody, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, December 4, 1978, at 54.
107. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
108. But see Cramton, DriverBehavior andLegalSanctions, 67 MICH. L. REv.421, 44 1-

42 (1969).
109. 76 Misc. 2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
110. Id. at 24, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 308 (quoting Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401,404, 179
N.E.2d 497, 498, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (1961)).
111. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 n.8 (1962). But see Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514, 522-26 (1968). See generally DRINKING, supra note 2, at 39-42.

112. Under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962), it would be unconstitutional to punish a person solely for being an alcoholic. DRINKING, supra note 2, at 317. However, as recognized by the Supreme Court in
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the fact that a person is an alcoholic does not absolve
him or her from liability for criminal acts committed while in an intoxicated state:
"[Alppellant was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while
drunk on a particular occasion. The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere
status, as California did in Robinson; nor has it attempted to regulate appellant's behavior in

the privacy of his own home. Rather, it has imposed upon appellant a criminal sanction for
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Conclusion
Twenty-one years have passed since Gombos was decided. In that
time, the number of fatal and injury motor vehicle accidents caused
annually by intoxicated drivers has increased significantly. Yet, laboring under the precedential weight of Gombos and Strauss, and apparently disregarding the trend in other jurisdictions, the California courts
have continued to reject the application of punitive damages as a
means of deterring intoxicated drivers. In view of "the appalling, perhaps incalculable, cost of torn and broken lives incident to alcohol
abuse, in the area of automobile accidents alone," ' 1 3 continued adherence to the Gombos-Strauss rule is no longer tenable.
In deciding Taylor, the California Supreme Court must not allow
obscure legal distinctions to prevent it from adopting a position mandated by public policy. 114 If the standards for malice set forth in Davis' l5 and in Gombos' l 6 have proven too inflexible to accommodate
this change, they should be set aside and a new, more flexible standard
should be adopted. That standard, as proposed by this Note, should
include conscious disregard of another's rights or safety as an alternative description of malice.
Adoption of the conscious disregard standard will facilitate the allowance of punitive damages in cases involving aggravated, yet nondeliberate torts. More importantly, it will allow the imposition of
public behavior which may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for appellant
and for members of the general public, and which offends the moral and esthetic sensibilities
of a large segment of the community." Id. at 532. For a general discussion of both the
Robinson and Powell decisions, see DRINKING, supra note 2, at 316-20.
113. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154, 577 P.2d 669, 675, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534, 540 (1978).
114. "Our jurisprudence reflects a history of difficulty in dividing negligence into degrees. The distinctions articulated in labeling particular conduct as 'simple negligence', 'culpable negligence', 'gross negligence', and 'willful and wanton misconduct' are best viewed as
statements of public policy. These semantic refinements also serve a useful purpose in advising jurors of the factors to be considered in those situations where the lines are indistinct.
We would deceive ourselves, however, if we viewed these distinctions as finite legal categories and permitted the characterization alone to cloud the policies they were created to foster. Our guide is not to be found in the grammar, but rather in the policy of the state in
regard to highway accidents. From that perspective, we see that the courts and the Legislature have evolved the notion that drunk drivers menace the public safety and are to be
discouraged by punishment." Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1976) (footnotes
omitted).
115. See notes 42-43 & accompanying text supra.
116. "In order to warrant the allowance of [punitive] damages the act complained of
must not only be wilful, in the sense of intentional, but it must be accompanied by some
aggravating circumstance, amounting to malice. Malice implies an act conceived in a spirit
of mischief or with criminal indifference towards the obligations owed to others. There must
be an intent to vex, annoy or injure." Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526-27, 322
P.2d 933, 939 (1958).
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punitive damages in cases involving intoxicated drivers. As experience
damages
has shown, intoxicated drivers must be deterred. If punitive
' 7
will aid in deterring such drivers, they should be allowed.

117. "[1The criminal courts have not been altogether effective and adequate in the control of the automobile traffic problems, and if punitive damages in an automobile tort action
can in any way help to solve this problem and decrease the highway slaughter, then they
should have a place in our system." Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile Cases, 1961
INS. L.J. 27, 27.

Postscript
While this Note was being published, the California Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Taylor v. Superior Court.' The court
held that operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an
act of malice when the circumstances evince a conscious disregard by
the driver of the probable dangerous consequences. Accordingly, the
court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reinstate Taylor's claim for punitive damages.
In reaching its decision the court adopted the conscious disregard
formula set forth in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court.2 The court
stated that to justify an award of punitive damages on the basis of conscious disregard, the plaintiff would have to establish that the defendant was "aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his
conduct," and that "he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those
consequences." '3 In the case of an intoxicated driver, the court found
that
[o]ne who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle,
thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties
with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably 4may be
held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.
Addressing defendant's contention that the rule of Gombos v.
Ashe 5 precluded a finding of malice based solely upon the intoxication
of the driver, 6 the court simply noted that although at the time Gombos
was decided it was unclear whether an award of punitive damages
could be based upon a finding of conscious disregard, "it 7has now become generally accepted that such a finding is sufficient."
Other than referring to Dean Prosser's work on torts8 and adopting
the Searle formula, 9 however, the court did not discuss any of the California cases supporting its position or otherwise attempt to buttress its
1. 24 Cal. 3d 890 (1979).
2. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
3. 24 Cal. 3d at 895-96.
4.

Id. at 896.

5. 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958).
6. See notes 33-39 & accompanying text supra.
7. 24 Cal. 3d at 896. The court went on to disapprove Gombos. Id. at 896-97.
8. As indicated by Justice Franson in discussing Justice Traynor's opinion in Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 118 P.2d 465 (1941): "(Rieliance on Prosser is
misplaced because the cases cited in Prosser are out-of-state decisions not involving a statute
similar to Civil Code section 3294." Franson, supra note 11, at 96.
9. 24 Cal. 3d at 895-96.
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conclusion.' 0 In addition, the court failed to acknowledge the Davis
line of cases" l or to explain the impact of its decision on the trial courts'

continuing application of the "actual-intent-to-injure" standard for

malice. 2
Much emphasis was placed by the court on the need to deter intoxicated drivers.' 3 The statistics cited by the court,' 4 as well as those referred to in this Note, 15 point out the urgency of adopting measures to
prevent the continued deluge of intoxicated drivers on the state's highways. In holding that under the conscious disregard standard, punitive
drivers, the court thus
damages could be awarded against intoxicated
6
proved itself sensitive to societal needs.'

10. The court, it should be noted, was correct in observing that conscious disregard of
another's rights or safety has emerged as an appropriate standard for malice. Indeed, this
Note so argues. See notes 49-74 & accompanying text supra. Nonetheless, in view of the
foreseeable impact of the Taylor decision on lower courts faced with applying the new standard, it was incumbent on the court to elucidate further the development and meaning of the
conscious disregard formula.
I1. The Davis line of cases holds that actual intent to injure must be found before
punitive damages may be awarded. See notes 42-43 & accompanying text supra. Justice
Clark, in his dissenting opinion, noted the continuing vitality of the Davis line of cases. 24
Cal. 3d at 906-07. Moreover, he acknowledged that, "[in the absence of direct evidence of
motive to vex, harass, annoy or injure, recent California decisions have recognized the requisite motive and willingness to injure in two situations based on outrageous conduct and a
conscious disregard of the plaintff's rights." Id. at 907. (emphasis added). Interestingly
enough, however, in light of his own comments, Justice Clark went on to state that the
majority opinion established "a new test for punitive damages." Id. at 908.
12. See notes 74-82 & accompanying text supra.
13. 24 Cal. 3d at 897. Justice Clark, however, argued that allowing punitive damages
to be imposed against intoxicated drivers would "not reduce the number of drunk drivers on
our highways." .d. at 901.
14. Id. at 898.
15. See notes 90-93 & accompanying text supra.
16. In his dissent, Justice Clark set forth numerous reasons for disallowing the impbsition of punitive damages in intoxicated driver cases. While a full discussion of his dissenting
opinion is beyond the scope of this Note, some of the reasons noted by Justice Clark have
been discussed briefly above. See notes 100-13 & accompanying text supra.

